Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

1967

Justice Black, the Demonstrators, and a Constitutional Rule of
Law
Charles E. Rice
Notre Dame Law School, charles.e.rice.1@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charles E. Rice, Justice Black, the Demonstrators, and a Constitutional Rule of Law, 14 UCLA L. Rev. 454
(1966-1967).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/459

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

JUSTICE BLACK, THE DEMONSTRATORS,
AND A CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
OF LAW
Charles E. Rice*
In evaluating here briefly a jurist whose career as a shaper of
the fundamental law has spanned the past three decades, one treads
warily for fear of oversimplification. It would be an easy thing to
categorize such a man as Justice Black, to pigeonhole him and his
philosophy in the compartment marked "liberal" or "activist" and to
let it go at that, serene in the thought that the classification had exhausted the subject. But such a categorization would be illusory and
perilous were it not hedged about by those qualifications required
in an evaluation of a productive mind.
Justice Black's thought processes do not respond readily to
classification. This becomes apparent when we consider, on the one
hand, his frequently expressed view of the first amendment as an
absolute protection of free expression and, on the other, his recently
emphasized readiness to curb that expression within the bounds of
reasonable and necessary regulations for the preservation of peace
and order in the community.'
The seeming rigidity of the first view is tempered by two considerations. One is the possibility of construing some types of speech
and conduct as beyond the pale of the first amendment, thereby
facilitating limited restrictions by government action unencumbered
2
by the absolutist prohibitions of the first amendment. The other
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1 In his James Madison Lecture at New York University in 1960, Justice Black

said: "It is my belief that there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they
were put there on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their
prohibitions to be 'absolutes.'" Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865,
867 (1960).
2 Justice Black described this view in the following terms with reference to the
term "unreasonable" in the fourth amendment: "The use of the word 'unreasonable'
in this Amendment means, of course, that not all searches and seizures are prohibited.
Only those which are unreasonable are unlawful. There may be much difference of
opinion about whether a particular search or seizure is unreasonable and therefore
forbidden by this Amendment. But if it is unreasonable, it is absolutely prohibited."
Id. at 873.
Or, as Justice Black expressed it with more general reference to all liberties
covered by the Bill of Rights: "I shall not attempt to discuss the wholly different
and complex problems of the marginal scope of each individual amendment as applied to the particular facts of particular cases. For example, there is a question as to
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is illustrated by his dissent in Barenblatt v. United States' where
he agreed that "a law which primarily regulates conduct but which
might also indirectly affect speech can be upheld if the effect on
speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct."'
Whether Black's position on the susceptibility of personal
liberties to government regulation is theoretically consistent, and
whether its practical consequences are tolerable, can best be evaluated through an analysis of some of his recent opinions dealing with
convictions of "sit-ins" and demonstrators. 5
Obviously, Justice Black cannot be accused of a lack of sympathy for legitimate demonstrators or of a reluctance to enforce
constitutional protections in their behalf. 6 However, in recent years
he has had occasion in this area to draw a practical line for the
whether the First Amendment was intended to protect speech that courts find obscene. I shall not stress this or similar differences of construction, nor shall I add
anything to the views I expressed in the recent case of Smith v. California. I am
primarily discussing here whether liberties admittedly covered by the Bill of Rights
can nevertheless be abridged on the ground that a superior public interest justifies
the abridgment. I think the Bill of Rights made its safeguards superior." Id. at 867.
If, then, the speech or conduct in question is within the protective gounds of
the Bill of Rights, Justice Black would appear to deny any power in any branch of
government to restrain it in any way.
3 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959).
4 Id. at 141. In approving a "balancing" test where the effect on speech is indirect, Black was careful not to approve the use of that technique where the effect
of the legislation on speech is direct: "I do not agree that laws directly abridging
First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing
process." Ibid. Nevertheless, his allowance of indirect infringement upon speech does
leave considerable latitude for legislative regulation, subject to the balancing test.
The "balancing" test, incidentally, has beern articulated thusly by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter: "To state that individual liberties may be affected is to establish the
condition for, not to arrive at the conclusion of, constitutional decision. Against the
impediments which particular government regulation causes to entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighed the value to the public of the ends which the
regulation may achieve." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367

U.S. 1, 91 (1961).
As shall he noted below, Justice Black has employed the "balancing" test on
occasion rather vigorously as a vehicle for upholding official limitations of conduct
and, indirectly, speech.
5 It will be useful to quote throughout extracts from some of the Black opinions
at length in order to assess his own practical utilization of the "balancing" technique
in cases where he deemed it justified.
6 See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961), the first sit-in case to reach the
Supreme Court, in which Justice Black joined in the majority opinion of the unanimous Court which reversed, for lack of evidence, convictions for disturbing the peace.
Cf. the opinion by Justice Black for the unanimous Court in Thompson v. City of
Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), which was relied upon by the Court majority in
Garner. Justice Black subscribed to the Supreme Court's decisions in the 1963 sit-in
cases, Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham,
373 U.S. 374 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Shuttesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963), in all of which the Court reversed convictions of sit-in demonstrators.
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limitation of individual freedom of action and to affirm that the
constitutional protections of expression must be construed in context
with the sometimes overarching requirements of an orderly society
governed by the constitutional rule of law.
In Bell v. Maryland,7 the Supreme Court remanded to the
Maryland Court of Appeals the criminal trespass convictions of
Negroes who had engaged in a restaurant sit-in. The five-man
majority rested the ruling on the ground that the state court
should have an opportunity to consider the convictions in light of
the public accommodations laws enacted by the State of Maryland
and the City of Baltimore subsequent to the convictions.
Mr. Justice Black wrote a biting dissent, joined by Justices
Harlan and White, in which he proceeded to give his opinion on the
merits of the case. In so doing, he spelled out the practical implications of his concepts of free expression. Throughout, he affirmed his
distinction between speech and action:
We reject the contention that the statute as construed is void for vagueness. In doing so, we do not overlook or disregard the view expressed
in other cases that statutes which, in regulating conduct, may indirectly
touch the areas of freedom of expression should be construed narrowly where necessary to protect that freedom. And we do not doubt
that one purpose of these "sit-ins" was to express a vigorous protest
against Hooper's policy of not serving Negroes. But it is wholly clear
that the Maryland statute here is directed not against what petitioners
said but against what they did-remaining on the premises of another
after having been warned to leave, conduct which States have traditionally prohibited in this country. And none of our prior cases has
held that a person's right to freedom of expression carries with it a
right to force a private property owner to furnish his property as a
platform to criticize the property owner's use of that property. 8
7 378 U.S. 226 (1964).

8 Id. at 325. In another part of his Bell opinion, Justice Black emphasized
the importance of preserving the integrity of orderly legal processes, even when
they are sought to be used by those who are ignobly motivated: "But a mechanical
application of the Fourteenth Amendment to this case cannot survive analysis.
The Amendment does not forbid a State to prosecute for crimes committed against
a person or his property, however prejudiced or narrow the victim's views may
be. Nor can whatever prejudice and bigotry the victim of a crime may have be
automatically attributed to the State that prosecutes. Such a doctrine would not only
be based on a fiction; it would also severely handicap a State's efforts to maintain
a peaceful and orderly society. Our society has put its trust in a system of criminal
laws to punish lawless conduct. To avert personal feuds and violent brawls it has
led its people to believe and expect that wrongs against them will be vindicated in
the courts. Instead of attempting to take the law into their own hands, people have
been taught to call for police protection to protect their rights wherever possible. It
would betray our whole plan for a tranquil and orderly society to say that a citizen,
because of his personal prejudices, habits, attitudes, or beliefs, is cast outside the law's
protection and cannot call for the aid of officers sworn to uphold the law and preserve the peace. The worst citizen no less than the best is entitled to equal protection
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After noting that the power to amend the Constitution rests
conjunctively in Congress and the States, and that "the Founders
gave no such amending power to the Court,"9 Black expressed in
stringent terms his resistence that the right of expression must be
qualified in some cases by consideration of the rights of others.' °
Of course, "balancing" can be an unconfined and vagrant exercise unless the balancer has not only a real concern for personal
freedom of action but also a clear conception of the competing value
for the protection of which the balancing is undertaken and the
personal freedom limited. For Justice Black, this competing value is
the constitutional rule of law, and indeed, for him it is virtually a
supreme judicial value even if the occasions for its restrictive application are limited. In his Bell opinion, Black expressed a readiness
to affirm that rule of law, not for the sake of restricting freedom, but
rather for the sake of preserving it and of preventing the development of a climate in which personal freedoms could be swept aside
by a rule of force. He concluded his Bell opinion with a ringing
peroration on behalf of this constitutional rule of law:
A great purpose of freedom of speech and press is to provide a
forum for settlement of acrimonious disputes peaceably, without resort to intimidation, force, or violence. The experience of ages points
to the inexorable fact that people are frequently stirred to violence
when property which the law recognizes as theirs is forcibly invaded
or occupied by others. Trespass laws are born of this experience. They
have been, and doubtless still are, important features of any government dedicated, as this country is, to a rule of law. Whatever power
it may allow the States or grant to the Congress to regulate the use
of private property, the Constitution does not confer upon any group
the right to substitute rule by force for rule by law. Force leads to
violence, violence to mob conflicts, and these to rule by the strongest
groups with control of the most deadly weapons ....

At times the

rule of law seems too slow to some for the settlement of their grievances. But it is the plan our Nation has chosen to preserve both
"Liberty" and equality for all. On that plan we have put our trust
and staked our future. This constitutional rule of law has served us
well. Maryland's trespass law does not depart from it. Nor shall we.'1

of the laws of his State and of his Nation. None of our past cases justifies reading
the Fourteenth Amendment in a way that might well penalize citizens who are law-

abiding enough to call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using
their own physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve their rights." Id. at

327-28.
9 Id. at 342.
10 "Unquestionably petitioners had a constitutional right to express these views
wherever they had an unquestioned legal right to be ....
But there is the rub in this

case-the contention that petitioners had a constitutional right to enter or to stay on
Hooper's premises against his will because, if there, they would have a constitutional
right to express their desire to have restaurant service over Hooper's protest, is a
bootstrap argument. The right to freedom of expression is a right to express views,
not a right to force other people to supply a platform or a pulpit." Id. at 344-45.
11 Id. at 346.
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In Cox v. Louisiana,1 2 Justice Black dissented from the majority's reversal of a demonstrator's conviction for a violation of a
Louisiana statute"5 prohibiting anyone, under any conditions, to
picket or parade near a courthouse, residence, or other building used
by a judge, juror, witness, or court officer, "with the intent of influencing" any of them. Black was uninfluenced by the peaceful
character of the picketing and was unwilling to. immunize that
picketing simply because it was not overtly boisterous or violent.'
In his opinion in Bell v. Maryland, Justice Black declined to
construe freedom of expression as conferring a license to invade
private property. In his Cox opinion, he went further and limited
the right to use the public streets in such a way as to interfere
seriously with the orderly processes of that constitutional rule of
law which he espoused in the Bell case. 5
Justice Black's opinion in Cox is particularly significant because
he departed from a discussion and application of fairly neutral
principles to frame the issue in terms of the social realities underlying the facts presented by the Cox case. In this way, he concluded
his Cox opinion with an unusually impassioned warning to minority
groups that their road to progress lies within the constitutional rule
of law:
And minority groups, I venture to suggest, are the ones who always
have suffered and always will suffer most when street multitudes are
allowed to substitute their pressures for the less glamorous but more
dependable and temperate processes of the law. Experience demonstrates that it is not a far step from what to many seems the earnest,
honest, patriotic, kind-spirited multitude of today, to the fanatical,
threatening, lawless mob of tomorrow. And the crowds that press in
the streets for noble goals today can be supplanted tomorrow by street
mobs pressuring the courts for precisely opposite ends.
379 U.S. 559 (1965).
LA. REV. STAT. § 14:401 (Cumulative Supp. 1962).
"While I agree that the record does not show boisterous or violent conduct
or indecent language on the part of the 'demonstrators,' the ample evidence that this
group planned the march on the courthouse and carried it out for the express purpose
of influencing the courthouse officials in the performance of their official duties brings
this case squarely within the prohibitions of the Louisiana statute and I think leaves
us with no alternative but to sustain the conviction unless the statute itself is unconstitutional, and I do not believe that this statute is unconstitutional, either on its
face or as applied." 379 U.S. at 583.
15 "This statute, like the federal one which it closely resembles, was enacted to
protect courts and court officials from the intimidation and dangers that inhere in
huge gatherings at courthouse doors and jail doors to protest arrests and to influence
court officials in performing their duties . . . . Justice cannot be rightly administered,
nor are the lives and safety of prisoners secure, where throngs of people clamor against
the processes of justice outside the courthouse or jailhouse doors. The streets are not
now and never have been the proper place to administer justice. Use of the streets
for such purposes has always proved disastrous to individual liberty in the long
run, whatever fleeting benefits may have appeared to have been achieved." Ibid.
12

13
14
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Minority groups in particular need always to bear in mind that the
Constitution, while it requires States to treat all citizens equally and
protect them in the exercise of rights granted by the Federal Constitution and laws, does not take away the State's power, indeed its duty, to
keep order and to do justice according to law. Those who encourage minority groups to believe that the United States Constitution and federal
laws give them a right to patrol and picket in the streets whenever they
choose, in order to advance what they think to be a just and noble end,
do no service to those minority groups, their cause, or their country.
I am confident from this record that this appellant violated the Louisiana statute because of a mistaken belief that he and his followers had
a constitutional right to do so, because of what they believed were
just grievances. But the history of the past 25 years if it shows nothing
else shows that his group's constitutional and statutory rights have
to be protected by the courts, which must be kept free from intimidation and coercive pressures of any kind. Government under law as
ordained by our Constitution is too precious, too sacred, to be jeopardized by subjecting the courts to intimidatory practices that have
been fatal to individual liberty and minority rights wherever and
whenever such practices have been allowed to poison the streams
of justice. I would be wholly unwilling to join in moving this country
a single step in that direction. 16
These last two passages are extensively quoted here because of
their utility in showing the intensity of the Justice's insistence upon
the rule of law even when its application works a restraint upon the
groups seeking goals which he regards benevolently. But the Black
opinion in Cox may also be most useful to the students of the Constitution as a practical example of the application of the "balancing"
test. This can be seen in the passages in which he concurred with the
majority's reversal of the convictions based upon the Louisiana
statutes prohibiting breach of the peace and obstruction of streets
and sidewalks. Justice Black regarded the case as appropriate for
the "balancing" technique because "when passing on the validity of
a regulation of conduct, which may indirectly infringe on free speech,
the Court does weigh the circumstances in order to protect, not to
17
destroy, freedom of speech, press, and religion.'
In Cox, Justice Black applied the "balancing" test and found
the convictions unsupported by a narrow public interest sufficiently
defined.'" He then considered the breach of the peace statute invalid
16 Id. at 583-84.
17 Id. at 578.
18 "The statute therefore neither forbids all crowds to congregate and picket on
streets, nor is it narrowly drawn to prohibit congregating or patrolling under certain
clearly defined conditions while preserving the freedom to speak of those who are
using the streets as streets in the ordinary way that the State permits. A state statute
of either of the two types just mentioned, regulating conduct-patrolling and marching-as distinguished from speech, would in my judgment be constitutional, subject
only to the condition that if such a law had the effect of indirectly impinging on
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because, owing to its vagueness, it equipped the police with the
power to enforce it or not depending on their own personal whims or
prejudices. Black also disapproved of the statute prohibiting obstruction of streets and sidewalks because it exempted only labor
picketing and thus was a denial of the equal protection of the laws. 9
More recently, the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Louisiana,20
reversed the breach of the peace convictions of Negroes who peaceably "stood in" at a public library to protest alleged racial discrimination in the operation of the library. Justice Black wrote a dissent,
in which Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart concurred. In Bell,
Justice Black had denied the right of demonstrators to appropriate private property as a forum for their expression. In Cox, he
denied their right to use the streets in a manner contrary to the
indirect but real prohibitions of a statute designed directly to shield
the judicial process from mass pressures. And in Brown v. Louisiana,
he protested vigorously against what he considered to be the majority's acquiescence in the appropriation of public buildings as
arenas for the expression of protest. Applying again, and it seems
consistently, his doctrine that expression is subject to indirect regulation when confronted by a proportionate public interest, Justice
Black dismissed the petitioners' contention that their status as protestors insulated them from conviction for their statutorily prohibited conduct of remaining in the library,2 ' and attacked with particular force the majority's reliance upon the first amendment to
sanction the invasion of the public library. 2 Black emphasized that,
freedom of speech, press, or religion, it would be unconstitutional if under the circumstances it appeared that the State's interest in supressing the conduct was not
sufficient to outweigh the individual's interests in engaging in conduct closely involving his First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 577.
19 See id. at 581.
20 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
21 "There is simply no evidence in the record at all that petitioners were arrested
because they were exercising the 'right to protest.' It is nevertheless said that this
was the sole reason for the arrests. Moreover, the conclusion that the statute was unconstitutionally applied because it interfered with the petitioner's so-called protest
establishes a completely new constitutional doctrine. In this case this new constitutional principle means that even though these petitioners did not want to use the
Louisiana public library for library purposes, they had a constitutional right nevertheless to stay over the protest of the librarians who had lawful authority to keep
the library orderly for the use of people who wanted to use its books, its magazines,
and its papers. But the principle espoused also has a far broader meaning. It means
that the Constitution, the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, requires the custodians and supervisors of the public libraries in this country to stand helplessly by
while protesting groups advocating one cause or another, stage 'sit-ins' or 'stand-ups'
to dramatize their particular views on particular issues." Id. at 165.
22 "This is the First Amendment which, as I have said in the past, is to me the
very heart of our free government without which liberty and equality cannot exist.
But I have never thought and do not now think that the First Amendment can sustain
the startling doctrine the prevailing opinion here creates. The First Amendment, I

1967]

THE DEMONSTRATORS

in his view, there had been no racial discrimination directed by the
library authorities against petitioners on the occasion in question.2 3
Moreover, the Justice warned that the principle of the majority
opinion threatened paralysis of24government by the invasion of public

buildings other than libraries.

As in Cox, the Black opinion in Brown v. Louisiana contained
an emphatic denial that the Constitution affords to minority groups
which have suffered from discrimination an unlimited right to seize
public property as a stage for protest.25 Indeed, Justice Black issued
a veiled warning to minority groups that even lawful demonstrations can lead to unlawful and self-destructive ones.26
In the current term of the Supreme Court, Justice Black
delivered the opinion for the five-man majority in Adderley v.
think, protects speech, writings, and expression of views in any manner in which
they can be legitimately and validly communicated. But I have never believed that
it gives any person or groups of persons the constitutional right to go wherever they
want, whenever they please, without regard to the rights of private or public property
or to state law. Indeed a majority of this Court said as much in Cox v. Louisiana....
Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and religion, it does not guarantee to any
person the right to use someone else's property, even that owned by government and
dedicated to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas. The novel constitutional doctrine of the prevailing opinion nevertheless exalts the power of private nongovernmental groups to determine what use shall be made of governmental property
over the power of the elected governmental officials of the States and the Nation."
Id. at 166.
23 Id. at 160.
24 "And it should be remembered that if one group can take over libraries for
one cause, other groups will assert the right to do it for causes which, while wholly
legal, may not be so appealing to this Court. The States are thus paralyzed with
reference to control of their libraries for library purposes, and I suppose that inevitably the next step will be to paralyze the schools. Efforts to this effect have already
been made all over the country." Id. at 165.
25 "It is high time to challenge the assumption in which too many people have
too long acquiesced, that groups that think they have been mistreated or that have
actually been mistreated have a constitutional right to use the public streets, buildings, and property to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want, without regard
to whom it may disturb." Id. at 162.
26 "It is an unhappy circumstance in my judgment that the group, which more
than any other has needed a government of equal laws and equal justice, is now encouraged to believe that the best way for it to advance its cause, which is a worthy
one, is by taking the law into its own hands from place to place and from time to
time. Governments like ours were formed to substitute the rule of law for the rule
of force. Illustrations may be given where crowds have gathered together peaceably
by reason of extraordinarily good discipline reinforced by vigilant officers. 'Demonstrations' have taken place without any manifestations of force at the time. But I
say once more that the crowd moved by noble ideals today can become the mob
ruled by hate and passion and greed and violence tomorrow. If we ever doubted that,
we know it now. The peaceful songs of love can become as stirring and provocative
as the Marseillaise did in the days when a noble revolution gave way to rule by
successive mobs until chaos set in. The holding in this case today makes it more
necessary than ever that we stop and look more closely at where we are going." Id.
at 167-68.

UCLA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:454

Florida,27 upholding the trespass convictions of thirty-two demonstrators who remained on the ground of a county jail yard after the
sheriff ordered them to leave. Petitioners, students at Florida A & M
University, had gone to the jail to protest the incarceration there
of fellow students who had been arrested during demonstrations at
public theatres. Justice Black followed the thrust of his opinions
in Cox and Brown, distinguishing a jail house from the State Capitol
grounds involved in Edwards v. South Carolina.28 The demonstrators
in Edwards, whose convictions were reversed by the Supreme Court,
had been convicted under a broadly drawn breach of the peace
statute, while the demonstrators in Adderley were convicted under
a narrowly drawn trespass statute. More importantly, it seems,
state capitol grounds are traditionally open to the public; jails,
maintained for security purposes, are not. The demonstrators at the
Capitol in the Edwards case entered through a public driveway and,
as they went in, were told by state officials that they had a right as
citizens to visit the grounds of the State House as long as they were
peaceful. In Adderley, the demonstrators entered the jail grounds
through a driveway used only for jail purposes without giving
warning to, or gaining permission from, the sheriff;2 9 and once
there, according to the majority Justices, the demonstrators blocked
vehicular access to the jail. What the Adderley majority holds is
that under the circumstances of the case petitioners had no constitutional right to remain on the jail premises over the protests of
the jail custodian. And, it is fair to conclude that Justice Black and
the majority would have found such an obligation to depart even
if petitioners had not been blocking access, to the jail.
The determination of Justice Black not to contort constitutional
principles, as he conceives them, to protect racial or other demonstrators who violate the law, was also illustrated in Hamm v. City
of Rock Hill,0 where the Supreme Court held that the passage by
Congress of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had operated to terminate
all pending prosecutions of public-accommodations demonstrators
for violation of state trespass statutes. Justice Black dissented, delivering in conclusion what must stand as one of the classic indictments of a Supreme Court majority for statutory misconstruction:
Nothing in the language or history of the 1964 Act makes the Court's
reading into it of a purpose to interfere with state laws "inevitable"
or even supportable, nor in any way justifies the Court's offhand as-

sertion that it is carrying out the "legislative purpose." For I do not
27
28
29
30

87 Sup. Ct. 242 (1966).
372 U.S. 229 (1963).
87 Sup. Ct. 242, 247 (1966).
379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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find one paragraph, one sentence, one clause, or one word in the 1964
Act on which the most strained effects of the most fertile imagination
would support such a conclusion. And in what is perhaps the most extensive and careful legislative history ever compiled, dealing with one
of the most thoroughly discussed and debated bills ever passed by Congress, a history including millions and millions of words written on
tens of thousands of pages contained in volumes weighing well over
half a hundred pounds, in which every conceivable aspect and application of the 1964 Act were discussed ad infinitum, not even once did
a single sponsor, proponent or opponent of the Act intimate a hope or
express a fear that the Act was intended to have the effect which the
Court gives it today. 8x

What, then, do his "sit-in" opinions reveal of Justice Black?
Not unexpectedly, they show for one thing a jurist committed to
absolute freedoms 8 2 but nonetheless one who recognizes the importance of the definitional task which necessarily precedes any
affirmation of absolutes. The precise line beyond which protected
speech becomes "action" susceptible to regulation will vary with
the subject involved and with the judgment of the individual. What
Justice Black did in the "sit-in" cases was to draw that line firmly
with reference to the facts at hand, and his firmness and precision
in doing so were impressive.
Nevertheless, we must be wary of implying that the differences
between Justice Black and the majority Justices in these cases are
greater than they actually are. In none of the cases did the majority
adopt a wholly absolute view of freedom of expression. Rather, as
in Cox v. Louisianaand Brown v. Louisiana, the prevailing Justices
seemed to rest upon the conclusion that the conduct in question
did not amount to a sufficient threat to the peace to sustain a constitutional application of the statute. 8 Mr. Justice Fortas, in
writing the prevailing opinion for himself, the Chief Justice, and
Justice Douglas in Brown v. Louisiana, was not without some
precedent for his evaluation of the facts in that case. It appears
that the demonstrators in Brown did not subjectively intend to
create a disturbance amounting to a breach of the peace, and
further that their conduct was objectively less provocative than
that of the demonstrators, for example, in Garner v. Louisiana4
at 321-22.
See Black & Cahn, Justice Black and the First Amendment "Absolutes": A
Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 549 (1962).
33 "If we compare this situation with that in Garner, we must inevitably conclude that here, too, there is not the slightest evidence which would or could sustain
the application of the statute to petitioners. The statute requires a showing either of
'intent to provoke a breach of the peace,' or of 'circumstances such that a breach of
the peace may be occasioned' by the acts in question. There is not in this case the
slightest hint of either." 383 U.S. at 139.
84 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
31 Id.
82
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and Taylor v. Louisiana" where the convictions were reversed by
the Supreme Court.86
The prevailing opinion of Justice Fortas and the separate concurrences of Justices Brennan and White in the Brown case do not
assert or even imply that demonstrators protesting against alleged
racial discrimination possess an absolute immunity to regulation of
their conduct. Rather, the Fortas opinion seems to imply that the
demonstrators' speech and conduct would enjoy an immunity only
so long as they were orderly and not boisterous; and the prevailing
opinion in Brown regarded the demonstrators' conduct as sufficiently orderly and silent to be insulated from punishment."7
Justice Black, on the other hand, found it irrelevant to a proper
construction of the Louisiana statute whether the demonstrators
"who do not want library service stay there an unusually long time
after being ordered to leave, make a big noise, use some bad
language, engage in fighting, try to provoke a fight, or in some other
way become boisterous."8 81 Rather, the Black opinion relied upon
that portion of the Louisiana statute which, in his words, "makes it
an offense to disturb the peace by congregating in a public building
39
over the protest of a person rightfully in charge of the building.1
35 370 U.S. 154 (1962).
36 The Fortas opinion in Brown draws the comparison in this way: "The library
room was empty, except for the librarians. There were no other patrons. There were
no onlookers except for the vigilant and forewarned sheriff and his deputies. Petitioners did nothing and said nothing even remotely provocative. The danger, if any
existed, was surely less than in the course of the sit-in at the 'white' lunch counters
in Garner. And surely there was less danger that a breach of the peace might occur
from Mrs. Katie Reeves and Mrs. Perkins in the adult reading room of the Clinton
Branch Library than that disorder might result from the 'restless' white people in
the bus depot waiting room in Taylor, or from the 100 to 300 'grumbling' white onlookers in Cox. But in each of these cases, this Court refused to countenance convictions under Louisiana's breach of the peace statute." 383 U.S. at 140.
37 "We are here dealing with an aspect of a basic constitutional right-the right
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
assembly, and freedom to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The
Constitution of the State of Louisiana reiterates these guarantees. See Art. I, §§ 3, 5.
As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights are not confined to verbal expression.
They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a
peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence, in a
place where the protestant has every right to be, the unconstitutional segregation of
public facilities. Accordingly, even if the accused action were within the scope of the
statutory instrument, we would be required to assess the constitutional impact of its
application, and we would have to hold that the statute cannot constitutionally be
applied to punish petitioners' actions in the circumstances of this case. See Edwards
v. South Carolina.... The statute was deliberately and purposefully applied solely to
terminate the reasonable, orderly, and limited exercise of the right to protest the unconstitutional segregation of a public facility." Id. at 141-42.
88 Id. at 162.
89 Id. at 155. The statute involved in Brown read:
Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circum-
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THE DEMONSTRATORS

In his factual interpretation, Justice Black found that the conduct
of the library demonstrators, even though not boisterous or loud,
entailed a sufficient risk of a breach of the peace to justify the
convictions. Therein he differed from the three plurality Justices,
Justice White, and apparently Justice Brennan. 0 Justice Black, in
finding a sufficient risk of breach of the peace, "balanced" the interests involved by concluding that far less of a disturbance would
suffice to support such a finding in the case of a public library than,
for example, in the case of the street demonstrations involved in
Cox v. Louisiana."' Having found that the circumstances in Brown
were such that, in the words of the statute, "a breach of the peace
may be occasioned thereby," Justice Black went on to state that
in such a case there is a duty to obey a properly given order to
leave the public library; or, conversely, that there is no right to
remain there indefinitely as a manifestation of protest. In this
respect, it must be said that the Black analysis is more realistic
than the open-ended license conferred on the demonstrators by
Justice Fortas in his plurality opinion. For, Justice Fortas seems to
imply that, given the peaceable and orderly manner of the demonstrators' protest, they had a right to remain in the building all day.42
When one considers the possible applications and extensions of the
Fortas view, the Black analysis takes on an added attraction. 3
This discourse on Brown v. Louisiana will hopefully serve to
show that much of the difference between Justice Black and his
colleagues is factual. But not all of it. For, the factual interpretations in a case such as Brown are inevitably formed in part by the
values of the individual interpreters. And in Justice Black's view
stances such that a breach of the peace may he occasioned thereby . . .
congregates with others . . . in any . . . public building . . . and who
fails or refuses to .. .move on, when ordered so to do by any law enforcement officer of any municipality . . . or any other authorized person . . .
shall be guilty of disturbing the peace. LA. REV. STAT.,

§ 14:103.1 (Cumu-

lative Supp. 1962).
40 Justice Brennan, having decided that the statute on its face was too broadly
drawn, did not evaluate the demonstrators' conduct on its factual merits beyond his
conclusion that it was not the sort of "hard-core conduct" that would obviously be
prohibited under any construction of the statute. Id. at 147-48.
41 Id. at 144.
42 Id. at 141.
43 Justice Douglas, writing in dissent for himself, the Chief Justice and Justices
Brennan and Fortas in Adderley v. Florida, 87 Sup. Ct. 242 (1966), viewed the convictions of the jail yard demonstrators as interfering with a constitutionally protected
petition for redress of grievances. "The jailhouse," Douglas wrote, "like an executive
mansion, a legislative chamber, a courthouse, or the statehouse itself . . .is one of
the seats of government whether it be the Tower of London, the Bastille, or a small
country jail. And when it houses political prisoners or those whom many think are
unjustly held, it is an obvious center for protest." Id. at 248. The dissenters, though,
did acknowledge that some public places such as the Senate gallery, may be out of
bounds for noisy demonstrations. Id. at 251.
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of society, the notion of responsibility and duty would seem to play
a larger role than in the views of his colleagues who appear to
emphasize personal liberties and rights to such an extent that the
emphasis could imperil that security and order without which those
rights are merely conceptual. Moreover, the intensity of Justice
Black's convictions on this score may be judged from his readiness,
as in Cox and Brown, to admonish minority groups that they, above,
all, need the protection of a rule of law. And it is fortunate that
such a warning should come from one such as he who surely cannot be faulted as an enemy of equal rights for all races.
Although the civil rights demonstrations and campaigns of
"civil disobedience ' 4 4 over the past ten years have served to focus
public attention on the real problems of racial discrimination, they
appear to have transgressed the point of diminishing returns and
may be justly criticized. For one thing, mass or provocative demonstrations do carry, immediately or cumulatively, a potential of
violence.45 But on another and more important level, the campaign
of "civil disobedience" has advanced the corrosive doctrine of
selective obedience to law. Basically, the campaign of "civil disobedience" tends to engender a disrespect for law by the implication that the forms of representative government and judicial
process are incapable of affording racial justice unless stimulated or
coerced by mass pressure.
A moment's reflection will reveal the inherently disintegrating
tendency which follows upon the general practice of a doctrine of
selective obedience to law. If one man is to claim the right to
pick and choose what laws he will obey, why not every other man
as well? And, of course, to concede a general right to be selective
in obedience to law is to begin the descent to chaos and anarchy.
This is not to imply that Justice Black would agree with these
personal observations. Rather, my purpose is to emphasize that it
is fortunate that a jurist such as Justice Black has expressed so
forcefully in his own way that the rights of expression and protest,
however worthy the cause in which they are asserted, are bounded
at their outer limits by the dictates of an orderly society under
the constitutional rule of law.4"
44 The term "civil disobedience" is a misnomer when applied to deliberate violations of criminal laws. What is involved is basically not civil but criminal disobedience of law.
45 Justice Black commented in Brown v. Louisiana on the potentiality of peaceful
demonstrations to degenerate into violence. 383 U.S. at 168.
46 It is a particular pleasure to offer this evaluation of Justice Black's sit-in
opinions because I have on other occasions criticized what to me appears to be his
unrealistic application of the definition of speech and its susceptibility to regulation
in cases involving subversive activities. See Rica, FREEDom OF AssOcIATIoN 127-75
(1962).

